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THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Professor Linda Mullenix and Professor Gene Shreve have recently 
ventilated two intertwined issues at the core of modern federal civil proce-
dure.1 They questioned scholars' growing criticism of the idea that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are trans-substantive. Both writers also 
asked about the increased emphasis th~t commentators have accorded pro-
cedure's detrimental effects on specific rights, such as civil rights, and on 
particular groups or litigants, such as minorities. The preferable response 
to these plaints is a single word: Congress.2 Because the issues that Professors 
Mullenix and Shreve raise are thought-provoking, however, they deserve 
elaboration. 
Professor Shreve observed that "[i]ncreasingly, civil procedure literature 
stresses procedure's impact on particular sets of rights or on particular 
groups"3 and that "much contemporary scholarship has disparaged trans-
substantive approaches to identifying the function and value of civil pro-
cedure. " 4 Professor Mullenix stated that the "accepted premise of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that they are rules of general applica-
* Professor of Law, University ·of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Tammy 
Wyatt-Shaw for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing 
this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REY. 795 (1991); Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of 
Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85 (1991). 
2. The response comes from one whom Professors Mullenix and Shreve simultaneously 
cited and perhaps indicted. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 1, at 823 (citing Carl Tobias, Public 
Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REY. 270, 271-72 
(1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Public Law Litigation] for idea that civil rules detrimentally affect 
specific rights and particular groups); Shreve, supra note l, at 92 n.36 (citing Carl Tobias, 
Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REv. 105 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, 
Recalibrated] for similar proposition); Shreve, supra note 1, at 92 n.39 (citing Tobias, Public 
Law Litigation for idea that "much contemporary scholarship has disparaged trans-substantive 
approaches"). I have not criticized trans-substantive approaches to the Rules; I have simply 
observed that they have decreasing applicability to the Rules and that the Rules are decreasingly 
trans-substantive. See, e.g., Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra, at 338-39. Correspondingly, 
I have analyzed civil rights plaintiffs througq the prism of Rule 11, see, e.g., Tobias, 
Recalibrated, supra; Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REY. 485 
(1988-89) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights Litigation]; environmental plaintiffs through the 
prism of Rule 11, see Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY 
L. REY. 429 (1992) and public interest litigants through the prism of Rule 24, see, e.g., Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation, supra, at 322-29; Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. 
REY. 415 [hereinafter Tobias, Standing]. I undertook this work primarily out of concern that 
the federal judiciary properly implement congressional intent by facilitating these litigants' 
vindication of congressionally prescribed substantive rights. 
3. See Shreve, supra note 1, at 92 (citations omitted). 
4. Id. (citations omitted). See generally Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: 
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-40 (1975). 
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bility, without regard to kinds of cases or litigants; thus, they transcend 
particular substantive law applications,"5 while she lamented that "[t]his 
trans-substantive theory of the federal rules has been under attack. " 6 
Professor Mullenix provided the following explanation of what she char-
acterized as the "public interest law critique": 
This perspective views litigation through a decidedly political lens 
that pits unempowered, resourceless individuals against big institu-
tional litigants with vast financial resources. The public interest 
critique of procedural rules reflects an ideology that litigation em-
bodies class, race, gender, and economic struggles. The basic theory 
of public interest partisans is that there are no such things as 
"facially neutral rules. " 7 
Professor Mullenix correspondingly invoked both ideas that Professor Shreve 
and she broached to criticize a public interest representative's request that 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee collect extensive empirical data on the 
effect which one rule's proposed revision would have on specific types of 
cases and particular litigants.8 
Numerous developments, for which Congress has been primarily re-
sponsible, respond to the questions that Professors Mullenix and Shreve 
have aired. Several institutions, principally Congress, pursuant to different 
sources of authority, have undermined the trans-substantive vision that most 
drafters of the original Federal Rules apparently held in 1938.9 
Congress has enacted many substantive statutes dubbed "social legis-
lation, "10 such as environmental measures, that erode trans-substantivity 
through their distinctive purposes and procedures. For example, if a plaintiff 
is attempting to vindicate a substantive purpose of civil rights legislation, 
such as reducing racial discrimination, a court should facilitate the plaintiff's 
vindication of that purpose. In this way, effectuation of the substantive 
congressional mandate can undermine trans-substantivity. 11 All of these 
enactments also expressly afford procedural benefits to parties who vindicate 
the measures' purposes. For instance, a number of environmental statutes 
5. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 829 n.176. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 823. 
8. See id. (citing Letter from Professor Laura Macklin, Associate Director, Institute 
for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, to Professor Paul Carrington, 
Advisory Comm. Reporter (Mar. 20, 1990)). 
9. See Cover, supra note 4, at 718 (discussing drafters' trans-substantive vision); accord 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspectil!e, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 944 (1987). 
10. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 2, 101-105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335 (1988); see 
also William Lilley III & James C. Miller III, The New "Social Regulation," 47 PUB. INTEREST 
49 (1977) (discussing social legislation). 
11. See Tobias, Standing, supra note 2, at 459-60; see also Cover, supra note 4. 
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explicitly prescribe intervention of right, 12 which can erode the trans-sub-
stantive nature of the provision made for intervention of right in Federal 
Rule 24(a)(2).13 
Since 1938, numerous additions to Title 28 of the United States Code, 
including aspects of the recent "judicial improvements" legislation enacted 
in 1988 and 1990, have had or could have similar effects. 14 One component 
of the 1990 statute, the Civil Justice Reform Act, requires each federal 
district to develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan and 
codifies the idea that experimentation is intrinsically valuable, thereby 
promising to undercut trans-substantivity .15 This mea8ure and the plans that 
a number of early implementation districts have now adopted pursuant to 
the measure prescribe systematic, differential procedural treatment in terms, 
for instance, of a particular lawsuit's complexity or its subject matter.16 
Congress, when passing the Civil Justice Reform Act, may have con-
templated that district courts would promulgate local rules that conflict with 
the Federal Rules. 17 The civil justice plan for the Eastern District of Texas 
proclaims that "to the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling." 18 
Moreover, approximately twenty Early Implementation District Courts have 
prescribed procedures governing mandatory prediscovery disclosure that are 
inconsistent with current Federal Rules and resemble proposals to revise the 
Rules that are so controversial that '. they · may not b·e adopted.19 This 
12. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (Supp. II 1990); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (1988). 
13. See Tobias, Standing, supra note 2, at 459-60; see also infra note 36 and accompa-
nying text. The drafters may have contemplated that trans-substantivity would be eroded, 
because Rule 24(a)(l) expressly provides for statutory intervention of right. A recent piece of 
social legislation that prescribes dissimilar procedures for different types of cases is the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, PUB. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); 
see generally Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 801 (1992). 
14. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
102 Stat. 4642 (1988); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, l'ub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089; see also infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (Supp. II 1990); see generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice 
Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Aruz. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 
Feb. 1993). 
16. See 28 u.s.c. § 473(a)(l) (Supp. II 1990); see, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE s. 
DIST. OF ILL., C1vJL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 4-6 ·(1991); U.S. DIST. 
COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MONTANA, ClvJL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 34 
(1991) [hereinafter MONTANA DISTRICT COURT PLAN]; see also SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 
JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AcT OF 1990, S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6826-27. 
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. II 19~0); see also S; REP. No. 416, supra note 16, 
at 14-32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6816-35. But see Lauren K. Robel, Fractured 
Procedure (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
18. U.S. DIST: COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 9 (1991); see generally Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice 
Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 51-52 (1992). 
19. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. AND BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, THE Civn. 
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development could well undermine that trans-substantivity which the Federal 
Rules presently retain.20 
Correspondingly, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, in recently for-
mulating proposals to amend three provisions of the Federal Rules, explicitly 
recognized that districts might make exceptions to the federal provisions by 
local rule.21 The Advisory Committee alsq_ suggested that the Supreme Court 
and ·congress revise Rule 83(b) to permit districts to adopt experimental 
local rules that conflict with the Federal Rules. 22 
Congressional acquiescence in the Supreme Court's promulgation of the 
1983 amendment to Rule 16, which expressly recommends that judges tailor 
various dissimilar procedures to specific lawsuits, additionally undercuts the 
Rules' trans-substantive nature. 23 For example, although the Advisory Com-
mittee Note which accompanies the revision proclaims that the "most 
significant change in Rule 16 is the mandatory scheduling order," the Note 
explicitly encourages district judges to "exempt certain categories of cases 
in which the burdens of scheduling orders exceed the administrative effi-
ciencies that would be gained. " 24 
The federal judiciary, for its part, has contributed substantially to the 
dismantling of trans-substantivity. All of the federal districts are responsible 
for _the proliferation of local rules that has undone trans-substantivity.25 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10 (1991); MONTANA 
DISTRICT COURT PLAN, supra note 16, af 18; U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF N.Y., Civn. 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4 (1991); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CzvIL PROCEDURE AND 
FORMS 16, 26 (1992); see generally Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L 
L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1. 
20. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2018-26, 2041-43 
(1989); cf. infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (observing that Federal Rules presently 
retain little trans-substantivity); see also infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
21. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26(a)(2)(C}, 
26(b}(2}, 54(d)(2)(D}, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 89, 91-92, 137 (1991). 
22. See id. at 53, 153. The Standing Committee did not send forward the proposal that 
would have permitted local rules to conflict with the Federal Rules. See COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS (1992). It apparently 
deferred to civil justice reform efforts that effectively permit districts to adopt similar 
experimental rules. 
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure 
in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 484, 527 (1986); see generally Tobias, Public Law Litigation, 
supra note 2, at 292 n.148. 
24. "Logical candidates [for exemption from Rule 16's mandatory scheduling] ... include 
social security disability matters, habeas corpus petitions, forfeitures, and reviews of certain 
administrative actions." FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory comm. note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 
207 (1983); see also David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice 
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1985 (1989). 
25. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (1989); Subrin, supra note 20, at 2018-26, 2041-43; see also Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation, supra note 2, at 292 n.148. 
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Concomitant experimentation, pursuant to those local rules or to express 
or inherent judicial authority, with a plethora of techniques, such as 
summary jury trials and differential discovery by case type, has eroded 
trans-substantivity.26 The second edition of the Manual for Complex Liti-
gation, which specifically suggests that judges tailor numerous particular 
procedures to individual complicated lawsuits, is a monument to non-trans-
substantivity. 27 
Judicial interpretation of several federal rules has had analogous im-
pacts. The quintessential example is the requirement that civil rights plaintiffs 
plead with specificity under Rule 8. All of the circuits now demand partic-
ularized pleading, 28 even though little judicial authority or empirical data 
support this requirement.29 The imposition of elevated pleading-in civil rights 
cases epitomizes the very ideas-creating different procedural requirements 
by kinds of lawsuits and types of litigants, thus reducing Rule S's trans-
substantive character-that Professors Mullenix and Shreve address. 30 
26. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods 
of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) (discussing summary jury trials); Subrin, supra 
note 20, at 2025-26, 2041-42 (discussing differential discovery); see also Robert F. Peckham, 
The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case From Filing to 
Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 779-89 (1981) (discussing techniques employed in experi-
mentation). 
27. See, e.g., MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION, SECOND §§ 33.1-.6, at 284-342 (1985) 
(suggesting procedures to be applied in efficiently managing six major categories of complex / 
cases); see also Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175-76 (1989); see generally Resnik, supra note 23, at 
526-27. 
28. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 
F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U,.S. 1084 (1985). The Supreme Court may soon 
resolve the issue of elevated pleading in civil rights cases. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th. Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. 
Ct. 2989 (1992). 
29. The courts may lack sufficient authority to demand particularized pleading. The 
Advisory Committee specifically prescribed elevated pleading only in Rule 9 covering fraud, 
rejected stringent requirements when initially drafting Rule 8, and has not modified these 
determinations while preserving liberal pleading meant to serve limited purposes. See E//iott, 
751 F.2d at 1482 (Higginbotham, J., concurring); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule 
for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677, 692 
(1984). The weak empirical basis for imposing stricter pleading requirements in civil rights 
actions is that they are more frivolous than other actions. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of 
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Wingate, supra, a~ 
688. 
30. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently articulated 
a more flexible standard for judicial modification under Rule 60(b) of consent decrees entered 
in public law cases. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992); see 
also Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 301-19, 322-31 (analyzing differential 
application of additional rules in ways that frequently disadvantage public interest litigants). 
Ironically, numerous courts have created a "public rights exception" to compulsory party 
joinder under Rule 19 that provides public interest litigants a forum in which to vindicate 
public rights, and this exception also erodes trans-substantivity. See, e.g.~ Conner v. Burford, 
848 F.2d 1441, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); Jeffries v. Georgia 
Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (11th Cir. 1982); see generally Carl Tobias, Rule 19 
and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745 (1987). 
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Indeed, for a considerable period, commentators have been exploring 
th~ decline of trans-substantivity. Many writers have credited Professor 
Robert Cover with the first major critique of trans-substantivity in 1975.31 
A quarter century ago, Professor Benjamin Kaplan, upon his retirement as 
Advisory Committee Reporter, specifically proposed that the Committee 
empirically study the advisability of altering the Rules' trans-substantive 
nature.32 There has been much subsequent work on trans-substantivity and 
its erosion.33 Illustrative are Professor Judith Resnik's 1986 observations 
that the "premise of trans-substantive rules has been silently undermined-
de jure and de facto" and that the "trans-substantive premise of the Rules 
has proved unworkable"34 and Professor Stephen Burbank's 1987 declaration 
that "many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and 
therefore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense. " 35 
Congress has some, albeit indirect, responsibility for increased schol-
arly interest in, and criticism of, procedure's adverse impact on specific 
sets of rights or on particular groups, which is the second idea that 
Professors Mullenix and Shreve raised. Congress clearly intended in much 
of the legislation mentioned above to bestow substantive rights and 
interests on specific groups or their members, such as women who 
allegedly were victims of discrimination. Congress also contemplated that 
the individuals would frequently litigate in groups, either because they 
experience injury as a group36 or because litigation costs require them to 
31. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to .Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded 
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 
U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2067-69 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-
Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244 
(1989); see also Cover, supra note 4. 
32. _See Letter to Dean Acheson, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules, from 
Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules (Mar. 2, 1967), in Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1925, app. at 1964 (1989); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 
137 U. PA. L. REv. 2125, 2126 (1989). 
33. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 31; Hazard, supra note 31. There are fifty-three 
Jaw review pieces that mention trans-substantivity. Search of LEXIS, Lawrev library, Allrev 
file (Oct. 16, 1992). 
34. Resnik, supra note 23, at 526, 547. 
35. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1474 (1987) 
(book review). The recent work of Professors Mullenix and Shreve testifies to lively, ongoing 
debate over trans-substantivity in the academy which apparently has not been replicated in the 
federal courts. The judiciary has contributed substantially to the decline of trans-substantivity: 
See, e.g., supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. It apparently has done so rather unself-
consciously, however. Indeed, there are no federal cases in which the term trans-substantivity 
appears. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file (Oct. 16, 1992). 
36. The classic study of sexual harassment as injury that women experience as a group 
is CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION (1979). Cf. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988) (expressing similar ideas regarding minorities as group); see 
generally STEPHEN c. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION (1987). 
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pool resources.37 Congress correspondingly meant for the federal judi-
ciary to facilitate these individuals' and groups' vindication of their 
rights and interests through litigation. An important way that Congress 
manifested this intent was to afford· the potential litigants certain pro-
cedural advantages, such as reducing requirements for them to secure 
standing and to recover attorneys' fees. 38 Considerable academic scrutiny 
of procedure's effects on particular rights or specific groups grew out 
of concern that the federal judiciary properly implement this congres-
sional intent.39 Indeed, insofar as perpetuation of a trans-substantive . 
theory of the Rules has restricted the vindication of underlying substan-
tive rights, trans-substantivity may have become the enemy of substance.40 
Another source of this growing scholarly interest in these procedural 
impacts has been increasing academic work in substantive areas, such as 
feminist legal thought and critical race theory. 41 Some of that research has 
focused on the intersection of substantive law with specific groups of 
individuals, characterizing such phenomena as sexual harassment, wife bat-
tering, and pornography as discrimination on the basis of gender.42 These 
writers naturally analyzed whether, and if so how, civil procedure facilitated 
37. Fee shifting statutes demonstrate Congressional recognition that litigation costs require 
groups to pool their resources. See infra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey S. 
Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and 
Statu.tory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REv. 291 (1990); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COUECTIVE ACTION (1965); BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978). 
38. The Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act provide potential litigants standing 
through citizen suit provisions and attorneys' fees if they prevail. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); 
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II 1990). Last Term, the Supreme Court restrictively interpreted a 
citizen suit provision in the Endangered Species Act and fee-shifting provisions in the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act and the Clean Water Act. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 
2130 (1992); City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). 
39. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 4; Tobias, Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 2; Wingate, 
supra note 29; Erik K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for 
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990). 
40. Professor Cover seemed to suggest a tension between trans-substantivity and sub-
stance. See Cover, supra note 4, at 718-22, 738-40. But cf. Hazard, supra note 31, at 2246-
47 (arguing that Federal Rules are employed in "social justice" litigation precisely because 
they are cast in general terms). 
41. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 
(1990) (feminist legal thought); Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: 
Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1991) (critical race 
theory); Patricia J. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equality 
Theory, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989) (both). 
42. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 36 (sexual harassment); CATHARINE A. MAC-
KINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (wife battering, sexual harassment, 
and pornography); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW (1987) (same); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from The Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 642-48 (1986) (wife 
battering and sexual harassment). 
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or hindered individuals' or groups' vindication of their underlying substan-
tive rights. 43 
For many years, scholars have been evaluating procedure's impact on 
particular rights or specific groups, just as they have been exploring the 
decline of trans-substantivity. For instance, Professor Kaplan stated soon 
after the 1966 revision of Rule 23 that it was intended to promote more 
vigorous use of the class action mechanism as a device for vindicating the 
rights of substantial numbers of people who could not otherwise litigate 
individually.44 Professor Cover concomitantly employed cases involving slav-
ery to illustrate how procedure might be used to facilitate the vindication 
of substantive human rights.45 . 
The civil procedure that federal courts in fact apply is rapidly under-
- mining the theory that the Federal Rules are trans-substantive. The theory 
and practice of legal scholarship are having similar effects, while they 
increasingly discredit the related idea that procedure can be applied without 
fully considering its substantive impacts on particular rights or specific 
groups. The federal judiciary and scholars must recognize that the trans-
substantive center will not hold, primarily because Congress has so declared 
and because courts have substantially eroded trans-substantivity. It is entirely 
too late to transfigure trans-substantivity, much less remain transfixed by 
it,46 and trans-substantivity should now go "gentle into that good night."47 
The preferable approach is to transcend trans-substantivity, to acknowledge 
candidly its limitations, and to recognize and meet forthrightly the compel-
ling challenge of formulating procedures that will efficaciously treat civil 
litigation in the twenty-first century. Most important, the procedural me-
chanisms developed and applied must facilitate litigants' vindication of 
substance, th~eby effectuating congressional intent and freeing· substance 
from the shackles of procedure. 
43. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 57-99, 158-74; Schneider, supra note 42, 
at 64i-48; Yamamoto, supra note 39, at 359-81. 
44. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv. 
497, 497 (1968); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 
98, 102 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 32, at 2126-27; supra note 39; see generally Abram Chayes, 
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). 
45. See Cover, supra note 4, at 722-32. 
46. Cf. Carrington, supra note 31, at 2067-68 (observing that Professor Cover's vision 
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might usefully forsake trans-substantive nature to serve 
substantive rights more efficaciously has never been "trans-substantiated" as draft of procedural 
rules to be considered as alternative to "trans-substantive" rules). 
47. DYLAN.THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in THE POEMS OF DYLAN 
THOMAS 213 (Daniel Jones ed., New Directions Publishing Corp. 1971) (1952). Cf. Burbank, 
supra note 35, at 1479 ("[t]oday, we should not be. talking about the decline of adjudicatory 
procedure, except perhaps as one would at a wake"). 
